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Abstract 
This paper quantifies the effect of non-traditional monetary easing at the 
zero lower bound on interest rate, so called “quantitative easing monetary 
policy” which the BOJ adopted from March 2001 through June 2006, by 
changing operating target for money market from the uncollateralized call 
rate to the outstanding current account balances held by financial institutes at 
the BOJ. The paper confirms that the monetary policy has contributed to the 
recovery of the prolonged deflation.  
First we estimate a minimal VAR model, which consists of the current 
account balances at the BOJ (CABs) as a policy variable, real GDP, and 
inflation rate. Next we decompose money stock into transaction money and 
precautionary money to evaluate the transmission mechanism of the effect of 
CABs on the real economy by taking into account the financial anxiety. We 
have found a quantitative easing shock firstly increases transaction money 
and then raises output and price, which dispels the anxiety. We also confirm 
that a liquidity trap did not exist during the period of quantitative easing 
monetary policy. 
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Introduction 
Many central banks implemented the unconventional monetary policy in response to the 
turmoil of the financial market triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008. The unconventional policy of expanding the central bank’s balance sheet is usually 
referred to as quantitative easing monetary policy (QEMP).The Federal Reserve conducted 
QEMP1 by purchasing a large quantity of assets in December 2008  The Bank of England 
also started the unconventional easy monetary policy by reducing the bank rate from 1% to 
0.5% and announcing to purchase ￡75 billion of assets over the three months funded by 
central bank money in March 2009. It was Bank of Japan which firstly adopted the QEMP in 
the intensified recession. The BOJ implemented the policy from March 2001 through June 
2006.  The BOJ restarted the QEMP again after the Lehman Brothers’ shock in 2008.  
Whether or not does the unconventional policy has really an effect on the improvement of 
economy is the subject of a lot of debate. Many empirical researches have been done on the 
first QEMP’s effect in Japan. Most of the researches show the negative results on the effect 
of QEMP2. However several researches confirm the effectiveness by the sample period 
contains the whole period of the first QEMP. 
The aim of the paper is to statistically quantify the effect of the Quantitative Easing 
Monetary Policy from March 2001 through June 2006 implemented by the BOJ on the 
Japan’s prolonged recession. We estimate the effect of the QEMP focusing on the role of 
expectation. The QEMP is supposed to foster the expectation that there would not be the 
financial uncertainty in the future. 
 
1 Overview 
Japan’s economy had experienced the prolonged recession after the bust of bubble in the 
early 1990s. The BOJ gradually reduced its policy target, uncollateralized overnight call rate 
to overcome the deteriorated economy. The BOJ lowered the rate to 0.02% in February 1999 
after the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, when several Japan’s major financial institutes 
collapsed and the Japan premium surged in the overseas markets. The BOJ literally took the 
“zero-interest rate policy”.  However the economy rapidly deteriorated when BOJ lifted the 
zero-interest rate policy by raising the call rate to 0.25% in 2000. In response to the difficult 
situation, the BOJ adopted the “quantitative easy monetary policy” by changing operating 
target for money market from the uncollateralized call rate to the outstanding current 
                                                        
1 FRB named officialy the program with the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). 
2 Ugai (2006) surveys the empirical researches on the QEMP. Many researches denied the effect of QEMP, or showed the 
very limited effect, if any, according to his survey.  
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account balances held by financial institutes at the BOJ3. The Target change of the CAB 
during the QEMP period is shown in Table 1. The BOJ started its new policy with 5 trillion 
yen in March 2001 and increased the reserves to reach 10 to 15 trillion yen in December 
2001. The BOJ set the reserve at the most, 35 trillion yen in January 2004. The required 
reserve is 4 trillion yen. The new policy ceased in March 2006, when the BOJ judged that 
further easing would trigger the inflation because CPI inflation rate has been slightly 
positive and the economy showed the signal of the recovery.  
However the role of money stock in the monetary policy has been graded down in the 
process of deflation. BOJ (2003) shows that there is not any close relationship among money 
stock and the real economy by performing the cointegration analysis among M2, real GDP 
and opportunity cost based on the data extending the period to 2002. 
 
Table 1 Target change of the CAB during the QEMP 
Date   Targets of the CAB 
March 19, 2001 From 4 trillion yen to around 5 trillion yen  
August 14, 2001 From 5 trillion yen to around 6 trillion yen 
September 18, 2001 From 5 trillion yen to above 5 trillion yen 
December 19, 2001 From above 6 trillion yen to 10-15 trillion yen 
October 30, 2002 From 10-15 trillion yen to 15-20 trillion yen 
March 25, 2003 From 15-20 trillion yen to 17-22 trillion yen 
April 30, 2003 From 17-22 trillion yen to 22-27 trillion yen 
May 20, 2003 From 22-27 trillion yen to 27-30 trillion yen 
October 10, 2003 From 27-30 trillion yen to 27-32 trillion yen 
January 20, 2004 From 27-32 trillion yen to 30-35 trillion yen 
March 9, 2006 Lift of QEMP 
 
2 Review of literatures on the QEMP 
The channels through which QEMP affects the economy are very controversial subjects. 
Monetary policy works through the interest rate channel in the normal situation. Monetary 
easing will increase monetary base which reduce the short-term interest rate. The lower 
interest rate affects the longer interest rates of financial assets, which will stimulate the 
investment and consumption, and finally contribute to the boost of economy.  However 
monetary policy does not work through this channel when the interest rate reaches at zero or 
close zero per cent. A liquidity trap appears because money and bond becomes a perfect 
substitute when interest rate is at the zero lower bound. 
                                                        
3 The quantitative easing framework which the BOJ adopted in March 2001 consists of the following three characteristics. 
(1) The changing of the main operating target for money-market operations from the uncollateralized overnight call rate 
to the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank (CABs).  (2) The commitment by the Bank to keep the new 
procedures for money-market operations in place until the CPI registers either zero per cent year-on-year growth or an 
increase. (3) Increases in the Bank’s outright purchases of long-term government bonds, in case it considers the increase 
necessary for providing liquidity smoothly. 
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Michael Joyce, Matthew Tong and Robert Woods (2011) briefly showed the channels 
through which asset purchase financed by central bank might affect the economy with a 
picture shown in Figure 1. They classified the channels into five: Confidence, Policy 
signaling, Portfolio rebalancing, Market Liquidity, Bank lending (Money).  1 confidence 
channel: the policy improves economic outlook and boosts consumer confidence, 2 Policy 
signaling channel: people believe that interest rates remain low for a long period, 3 Portfolio 
rebalancing channel: People who sell the assets to central bank will buy another assets, ie 
rebalance their portfolios, which raise the price of the asset and reduce the yields, which 
reduced the borrowing cost and stimulate the spending4, 4 Market liquidity channel: asset 
purchase provides the financial market with lots of liquidity, which would contribute the 
improvement of market functioning, especially in the turmoil of financial crisis, 5 money 
channel: Increased reserve would encourage the banks to extend the loans. 
 
 
Figure 1 Transmission Mechanisms of Asset Purchase by Central Bank 
Source: Joyce, Michael, M.Tong and R.Woods (2011) p.201. 
 
Several empirical works have been done on the effectiveness of monetary policy under the 
zero bound constraint of the interest rate. Baig (2002) shows that monetary policy still work 
well even at the zero interest rate by using VAR model. He points that expansion of 
monetary base has a positive effect on the prices and output. However his sample period 
from 1980 to 2001 includes the period when Japan’s economy is very sound and interest rate 
is far from zero. His result is not satisfactory because it does not reflect the effect of the 
                                                        
4 It is Tobin (1958) which firstly suggested the rebalance channel.  
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monetary base in the period of zero interest rate. Taking the problem into consideration, 
Kimura et al. (2002) estimated by using a time -varying VAR. A time -varying VAR can 
capture the changes in the policy that varies over time. Their result is that the effect of the 
increase in the monetary base at the zero interest rate period is very limited, if any, 
suggesting the inept of monetary policy.  Fujiwara (2006) also showed the same result by 
using a Markov switching VAR model. Their problem in common is that their sample period 
covers only the former period of the zero interest rate and quantitative easy monetary policy.  
Honda et al. (2007, 2010) and Harada and Masuda (2010) estimated the effectiveness of 
monetary easing by the sample period covers the whole implementation period of QEMP. 
Honda et al. (2007, 2010) estimated the effect of the QEMP on the Japan’s economy by the 
Vector auto regressing model composing of industrial production, CPI, and the current 
account balances at the BOJ.  In addition, they used several financial data including share 
price to identify the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. They concluded that the 
QEMP had a positive effect on the economy and the effectiveness worked through share 
price channel.  
Harada and Masuda (2010) also conducted the same VAR analysis in the period of the 
QEMP. They estimated based on the Honda et al (2007, 2010). They increased the number of 
variables to focus on the transmission mechanism. They basically confirmed the results of 
the Honda et al. They newly found the transmission mechanism through the bank’s balance 
sheet channel in addition to share price channel. 
Nakazawa and Yoshikawa (2011) estimated the effect of the QEMP by the VAR model 
composed of three variables; the current account balances, nominal GDP, and share price. 
They focus on the BOJ’s asset composition which expanded through the purchases of 
government bonds (JGB). They reconfirm the results of Honda et al. (2007, 2010) and 
Harada and Masuda (2010). However they indicate that the JGBs’ maturity which BOJ 
purchased in the QEMP is mainly from one to three years, suggesting that it would have a 
stronger effect if the BOJ purchased JGBs with the longer-term maturity. 
These new researches show that BOJ’s non-traditional monetary easing from 2001 
through 2006 had a positive effect on Japan’s economy, suggesting the BOJ should continue 
the monetary easing to conquer Japan’s deflationary economy. However they do not analyse 
the role of the anxiety in the deflationary economy. Under the severe deflation, people tend 
to stick to cash because they had the cash-flow constraints. 
Krugman (1998, 2000) indicated that additional monetary easing would not have a 
positive effect on the economy, because monetary base and bonds became a perfect 
substitute at the almost zero interest rate. Japan’s economy had fallen into “a liquidity trap.” 
He argued that natural rate of interest rate became negative in the deflation, while nominal 
interest rate could not be reduced below zero. He insisted to take the policy to foster the 
inflation expectation to exempt from the deflation trap. Inflation expectation will raise the 
natural rate of interest rate in the future, which will stimulate the consumption and 
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investment5. 
Several researches have been done on the change of the future expectation in the period of 
the QEMP. Okina and Shiratuka (2004) and Shiratuka et al. (2010) focus on the effect of the 
BOJ’s commitment to maintain the QEMP until core CPI registers stably zero per cent or an 
increase year on year. The longer term interest rate would decline even if the short term 
interest rate already reached at the zero interest rate, as far as the private sector confirms the 
BOJ’s commitment. The decline of the longer-term interest rate is expected to stimulate the 
investment and consumption6. They estimate the relationship between the future expectation 
and the economic variables (inflation rate, output and interest rates) by time-varying 
parameter vector autoregression model with stochastic volatility (TVP-VAR).  They 
conclude that the BOJ’s commitment does not have a positive effect on the dynamic 
relationship of prices and production, though it has succeeded in changing the future 
expectation of the financial market, firms, and household, only in the first year when the 
QEMP was adopted. 
We also investigate the role of expectation in the QEMP period from the different view 
point. We focus on the role of a kind of expectation, financial anxiety in the deflationary 
economy. We will clear why the BOJ should continue the quantity easing policy. People are 
afraid of the risk they cannot get money from the financial institute in the deflation. They 
tend to hold money as much as possible in order to avoid the cash-flow constrains. Such a 
financial behaviour of the people in the deflation rapidly increases the precautionary money 
demand. Money will not have a positive effect on the economy even if the central bank 
increases the money stock, because additional money will be absorbed as precautionary 
demand. The precautionary demand for money will decline if people confirm the BOJ’s 
strong commitment to continue the QEMP until the economy get rid of the deflation. 
The QEMP is supposed to have a positive effect on the economy, as far as the BOJ keeps 
to provide more money than the money which the firms and households need to make an 
economic activity smoothly in the deflationary economy. Thus, we estimate the effect of 
quantitative easing policy on the economy by decomposing money stock into the transaction 
and the precautionary money. The former money will contribute to the improvement of the 
economy, while the latter will not. The monetary easing would lose its effectiveness if 
additional money is absorbed as precautionary money. 
 
 
                                                        
5 Krugman insited the importance of inflation expectation in the recovery of the great Depression, citing the Romer 
(1992). He mentioned that the real expansion of the economy - and the rise in prices associated with that expansion - was 
the result of a rise in inflation expectations, which reduced real interest rates when nominal rates were already at the floor. 
Without this expected inflation, the expansion of monetary base that she stresses would have been ineffectual. See 
Krugman (1998) p.61. 
6 Ueda (2002) called the effect of monetary easing on the yield curve “the policy duration effect.” 
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3 VAR model 
3.1 The Data Property 
Variables and their symbolic notations are given below.The data we estimate here are the 
Current Account Balances at the BOJ (CAB), Money Stock (M2+CD), Business Cycle of 
Tankan Diffusion Index, the uncollateralized overnight call rate,  real GDP, and the core 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  These data are symbolized, respectively, dpst, m2, tankan, 
call, y, and p. All data except for the core CPI are obtained from Website of Bank of Japan. 
The core CPI is obtained from Website of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
The new variable has to capture the psychological change of people due to the financial 
anxieties. We used the Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of Japan known as 
TANKAN in order to qualify the unobservable variable. We display the behaviour of each 
variable in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 the behaviour of each variable 
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We apply two conventional unit-root tests, DF-GLS (ERS) and KPSS test to the logs of 
the time series for each variable. ERS tests the unit root of the time series as the null 
hypothesis, while KPSS test the stationarity as the null hypothesis. The results are shown in 
table 2. Tankan is shown to be stationary, while call, y and p are nonstationary.  We assume 
that dpst is nonstationary and that inflation (=p(t)/p(t-4)) is stationary, though these data 
cannot be strictly judged to be nonstationary or stationary by both tests. 
 
Table 2 Unit root test (1981q3, 2007q4) 
var. ERS(t-stats) lag KPSS(LM-stats) trend 
dpst -1.75526* 1 0.60521** const. 
tankan -2.83677** 1 0.20946 const. 
call -0.02444 0 0.98470*** const. 
y=log(realGDP) 0.84268 3 1.04898*** const. 
p=coreCPI 0.45950 4 0.983331*** const. 
inflation=p(t)/p(t-4) -1.46771 1 0.060818 trend+const. 
***, ** and,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
3.2 Model1 
We first estimate the simple three-variable VAR that consists of the Current Account 
Balances at the BOJ (dpst), real GDP(y), and the core Consumer Price Index (p=core CPI) 
where p is changed into inflation=p(t)/p(t-4).  All variables are estimated, following the 
result of unit-root test. The sample period is from Q2 2001 through Q4 2005. 
Letting	ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ሺ∆݀݌ݏݐ, ∆ݕ, ݂݈݅݊ܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ′ , we consider a growth rate system	described by 
VAR (Vector Auto Regression) model of the form:  
ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ܣଵݔሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ܣଶݔሺݐ െ 2ሻ ൅ ߝሺݐሻ 
The dynamic impulse response functions are shown in Figure 2. The first to third column 
show the dynamic responses of each variable to policy shock (CAB shock), an output shock, 
and price change shock, respectively.  The solid line shows the point estimate of impulse 
response function, while the dotted lines imply 95 % confidential interval. 
The interesting findings which the simple model gives are as follows. The first column 
shows that policy shock has a positive effect on real output. Output starts to increase with a 
lag of three quarters after CAB rises.  The positive response is statistically significant at 5 % 
level at third quarter. Quantity easing monetary policy surely contributes to the recovery of 
Japan’s recession. The second column displays that an output shock has an immediate effect 
on the price change.  The third column also shows that price change has a positive shock on 
the real output.  Thus, we can summarize the effect of monetary easing policy during the 
QEMP starting at March 2001 as follows. 
Quantitative easing monetary policy has a positive effect on Japan’s deflationary economy. 
The policy effect starts at the increase of current account balances at the BOJ. The effect has 
a positive effect on the economy, though it takes time for its effect to exert. Easing policy 
does not have an effect on the deflation. However, it has indirectly the effect on the price 
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change, through the effect on the real output.  Increase of real output tends to improve the 
deflation.  Improvement of deflation has a positive effect on the real output. 
 
Figure 3 Impulse Response Functions for 3 variables (∆(dpst),∆(y),inflation) 
 
3.3 Model 2 
Next we statistically quantify how much money contributed to the recovery of the 
economy when the BOJ increased the current account balances at the BOJ. We would 
decompose the money stock into the transaction money and the precautionary money.   
Precautionary demand will increase when the liquidity concern among the private sector 
intensify in the depression, while its demand will decrease when the concern dispels in the 
boom. We use here the Corporate Financial Position Diffusion Index issued quarterly by 
Bank of Japan known as TANKAN7 in order to quantify the unobservable variable, which 
would affect the precautionary demand. 
We assume the precautionary money demand as follows. 
 
                                                        
7 The Tankan is a statistical survey data by the BOJ, conducted quarterly every year. The survey is done to provide an 
accurate of business trends of enterprises. Business Condition asked ; 1 Favourable, 2 Not so favourable, 3 Unfavourable. 
Responses are aggregated into Diffusion Index (DI) as follows; 
DI = percentage share of enterprises responding choice 1 minus percentage share of  enterprises responding choice 3 
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݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ ൌ ݐݎ݁݊݀ ൅ ܿଵ ∗ ݐܽ݊݇ܽ݊ ∗ ݉2100000 
					൅ܿଶ ∗ ݀݌ݏݐ ∗ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൅ ܿଷ ∗ ݈݈ܿܽ ∗ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ∗ 1000,          (1) 
 
where the 2nd term on the RHS means that the precautionary money demand is a function of 
tankan*m2, because people try to hold more money when financial anxiety intensifies, it 
also depends on the level of m2, the 3rd term and 4th term represents the effect of the BOJ’ 
monetary policy. We take into the consideration the policy change by adding the dummy 
variables. The BOJ adopts the zero interest rate policy in February 1999 and temporarily lifts 
its policy in August 2000. It implements the QEMP from March 2001 through March 2006. 
Thus, the dummy variables are set as follows. 
 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 1					for  ݈݈ܿܽ
് 0,				1980ݍ1 െ 1998ݍ4, 2000ݍ3 െ 2000ݍ4, 2006ݍ3 െ 2007ݍ4 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 0					for  ݈݈ܿܽ ൌ 0,				1999ݍ1 െ 2000ݍ2, 2001ݍ1 െ 2006ݍ2 
and 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 1					for  ݈݈ܿܽ ൌ 0,				1999ݍ1 െ 2000ݍ2, 2001ݍ1 െ 2007ݍ4 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 0					for  ݈݈ܿܽ ് 0,				1980ݍ1 െ 1998ݍ4, 2000ݍ3 െ 2000ݍ4 
and 
݀ݑ݉݉ݕௗ௣௦௧ ൌ 1					݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௖௔௟௟ ൌ 1, ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ	2006	ݍ3 
 
’’trend’’ in equation (1) is defined by using dummy variables in each year: 
 
ݐݎ݁݊݀ሺݐሻ ൌ 1000 ∗ ሼܿሺ81ሻ ൅ ܿሺ82ሻ ∗ ଼݀ଶሺݐሻ ൅ ܿሺ83ሻ ∗ ଼݀ଷሺݐሻ ൅ ⋯൅ ܿሺ107ሻ ∗ ݀ଵ଴଻ሺݐሻሽ, 
 
where c(81) is constant during the whole interval (1981q3, 2007q4), and where dummy 
variables d82, d83, d84,..., d107 are of the form:  
 
଼݀ଶሺݐሻ ൌ 1						for		ݐ ൌ 1982q1, q2, q3, q4 
														ൌ 0																					otherwise, 
଼݀ଷሺݐሻ ൌ 1						for		ݐ ൌ 1983ݍ1, ݍ2, ݍ3, ݍ4 
														ൌ 0																					otherwise, 
⋯⋯⋯ 
݀ଵ଴଻ሺݐሻ ൌ 1					for		ݐ ൌ 2007q1, q2, q3, q4 
																	ൌ 0																					otherwise 
 
Instead of ݕ ൌ logሺݎ݈݁ܽܩܦܲሻ , nominal output denoted by log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሻ  is taken into 
consideration.  ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ  is expressed by the following equation and the log-
likelihood function of ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ   should be maximized with respect to every 
parameter containing precautionary demand. 
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∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐሻሻ 
							ൌ ݀଴ ൅ ݀ଵ ∗ ∆log	ሺ݊ܩܦܲሺݐ െ 1ሻሻ 
							൅	݀ଶ ∗ ∆ log൫݉2ሺݐ െ 1ሻ െ ݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ሺݐ െ 1ሻ൯ 
							൅	݀ଷ ∗ ∆log	ሺ݉2ሺݐ െ 2ሻ െ ݌ݎ݁ܿ. ݀݁݉ܽ݊݀ሺݐ െ 2ሻሻ ൅ ߝሺݐሻ    （2） 
 
Estimation results of equations (1) and (2) are given in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3  Estimation results in equation(1) 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
c1 -77.68188 44.26587 -1.754893 0.0793
c2 0.483055 1.107827 0.436038 0.6628
c3 -23.15774 23.21498 -0.997534 0.1668
 
Table 4  Estimation results in equation(2) 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
d0 0.001158 0.001485 0.779713 0.4356
d1 -0.095937 0.112673 -0.851458 0.3945
d2 0.293503 0.180195 1.628803 0.1034
d3 0.166242 0.120239 1.382588 0.1668
 
Estimation results of trend in equation (1) 
trend(t)= 
1000*(822.88+29.41*d82(t)-4.89*d83(t)-52.82*d84(t)-130.89*d85(t) 
-168.33*d86(t)-262.48*d87(t)-138.34*d88(t)-28.43*d89(t)-200.30*d90(t) 
-352.35*d91(t)-479.80*d92(t)-222.58*d93(t)-265.89*d94(t)-343.69*d95(t) 
-314.50*d96(t)-204.76*d97(t)-37.08*d98(t)+172.48*d99(t) 
+357.81*d100(t)+707.43*d101(t)+811.72*d102(t)+722.53*d103(t) 
+854.93*d104(t)+808.67*d105(t)+794.73*d106(t)+936.65*d107(t)) 
 
For space of economy, estimation of trend is given with only coefficients values.  
Figure 4 shows the nominal money stock and the transaction money. The difference 
between the two kinds of money measures the precautionary demand. We find that the 
difference begins to expand rapidly around 1990 when the bubble economy busted and 
gradually turns to shrink around 2001 when the QEMP has been introduced. The actual 
development of the transaction demand and precautionary demand is shown in Figure 5.  
The transaction money demand increases in 1980s when Japan’s economy is very sound 
and bullish, and declines in 1990 when the bubble economy busts. On the contrary, the 
precautionary money demand stays at low level in 1980s and gradually increases in response 
to the deteriorating economy. It rapidly increases in the period of financial crisis, 1998-
62 Journal of the Faculty of Economics, KGU, Vol.23, No.1, September 2013 
1999 8 . The deflationary concerns intensified in the private sector. It is the further 
deterioration of financial system and the liquidity constraints of financial institutions that 
sharply increased precautionary demand during this period. 
The QEMP contributed to expel the people’s anxiety caused by the financial system 
uncertainty, which destabilize the economy. The Figure 4 clearly shows the increase of 
transaction money demand and decline of the precautionary demand money after the 
introduction of the QEMP in 2001. 
 
 
Figure 4 money stock (M2) and transaction money 
 
 
Figure 5 precautionary money and transaction money 
                                                        
8 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of Japan’s city banks (largest twenty banks), and Yamaichi Securities Company, one of 
Japan’s four largest security companies, failed in November 1997. The failure of two big financial institutions sent the 
sign that the government gave up the “too big to fail” policy. People thought no financial institutions were immune from 
failures. Rumors about the other banks’ failure had spread out through Japan. The stock prices of many financial 
institutions sharply declined and “Japan premium” in the international money market jumped by around 100 basis points. 
Japanese banks were obliged to pay the additional basis points for raising funds in the oversea financial markets. The 
premium is calculated as the difference between the quoted rates of TIBOR in the Tokyo offshore market and LIBOR in 
the London offshore market. Bonds issued not only by Japanese financial institutions but also by Japanese government 
were downgraded at the investment grade ratings by international credit-rating agencies, such as Moody’s. 
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Next we estimate the five variables VAR model that consists of CABs, Tankan, 
transaction money, real GDP, and inflation rate (core cpi). We focus on role of Tankan in the 
transmission mechanism of easing monetary policy. 
Figure 6 shows the estimated impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to five 
variables. The first column shows that policy shock has a positive impulse on the transaction 
money at the second quarter, though it has a negative effect on the transaction money at the 
first quarter. The first negative shock is triggered by the increase of the precautionary money. 
It also has a positive impact on the real output at third quarter.  The second column shows 
that Tankan immediately affects the transaction money.  Transaction money increases as 
soon as anxiety is dispelled. Tankan also has a positive effect on both output and inflation 
rate. Price response is much delayed than output response. The positive response of inflation 
rate is statistically different from zero at fifth quarter.  
The third column shows that transaction money shock has a positive effect on the Tankan. 
Transaction money also has a positive effect on both output and price change. Increase of 
transaction money immediately increases real output, while it has a delayed effect on price 
change. The effect of transaction money on the price is statistically significant at fifth 
quarter. The fourth column indicates that real output has a positive effect on Tankan. Output 
shock has a positive effect on the transaction demand, though its shock on the price change 
is not statistically significant. The last column shows that price change has a positive effect 
on Tankan with five quarters delay. Price change has a positive effect on the real output at 
third quarter.  Real output response is statistically significant at the third quarter. The 
estimation results are summarized as follows. 
A quantitative monetary easing has a positive effect on Japan’s prolonged deflation. The 
transmission of the policy effect is through its effect on the transaction money.  In response 
to an increase of CABs, transaction money increase first. Transaction money contribute to 
the rise of real output and dispel of the anxiety in the future. Increase of transaction money 
also raises price in the five or six quarters. The rise of output and price changes people’s 
mind from negative to the positive. The increase of transaction money indicates that there is 
not a liquidity trap in the period of the QEMP.  
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Figure 6 Impulse Response Functions for 5 variables 
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4 Concluding remarks 
Many macroeconomist and policy makers have discussed on the effectiveness of non-
traditional monetary easing which the BOJ adopted at the zero lower bound on interest rate. 
Some blamed the BOJ by arguing the prolonged deflation of Japan’s economy attributed to 
the Bank of Japan’s past monetary policies. The other defend the BOJ’s policy by insisting 
that expanding unlimitedly the assets of the BOJ’s balance sheet without any favourable 
effect on the economy would risk the financial position of the Bank. 
The paper challenged the policy issues by quantifying statistically the effect of the 
monetary easing, during the period of QEMP. We have found monetary easing has a positive 
effect on the output and prices by estimating the simple VAR model composed of three 
variables; CABs, real GDP, and price change. Next we have estimated the transmission 
mechanism of the effect of monetary easing by decomposing money stock into transaction 
money and precautionary money, using the same VAR approach.  Some argued that Japan’s 
economy already fall into a liquidity trap in which additional monetary easing would lose its 
effectiveness, because the monetary base and bonds became perfect substitutes. They 
insisted that additional money would be absorbed as a precautionary demand even if central 
bank increased the base money. The money stock would not have any effect on the economy 
if people hold additional money stock by the precautionary motivation.   
We quantified statistically how much money was absorbed into precautionary money by 
adding the expectation variable (Tankan). People tend to increase the precautionary demand 
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if the deflation is expected to continue. We found that the precautionary money gradually 
declines after the QEMP has been introduced in 2001. The increased transaction money 
firmly contributed to the recovery of the economy. The new policy seems to mitigate the 
cash-flow constrain of firms and households. Thus, we conclude that the QEMP has the 
positive effect on the economy by dispelling future deflationary concerns. We also confirm 
the non-existence of a liquidity trap in the QEMP period.  
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